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to Increase Capital Efficiency by Product Design
Andreas Reuß, Jochen Ruß and Jochen Wieland
Abstract Traditional participating life insurance contracts with year-to-year
(cliquet-style) guarantees have come under pressure in the current situation of low
interest rates and volatile capital markets, in particular when priced in a market con-
sistent valuation framework. In addition, such guarantees lead to rather high capital
requirements under risk-based solvency frameworks such as Solvency II or the Swiss
Solvency Test (SST). We introduce several alternative product designs and analyze
their impact on the insurer’s financial situation. We also introduce a measure for
Capital Efficiency that considers both, profits and capital requirements, and compare
the results of the innovative products to the traditional product design with respect
to Capital Efficiency in a market consistent valuation model.
Keywords Capital efficiency · Participating life insurance · Embedded options ·
Interest rate guarantees · Market consistent valuation · Risk based capital require-
ments · Solvency II · SST
1 Introduction
Traditional participating life insurance products play a major role in old-age provision
in Continental Europe and in many other countries. These products typically come
with a guaranteed benefit at maturity, which is calculated using some guaranteed
minimum interest rate. Furthermore, the policyholders receive an annual surplus
participation that depends on the performance of the insurer’s assets. With the so-
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called cliquet-style guarantees, once such surplus has been assigned to the policy at
the end of the year, it increases the guaranteed benefit based on the same guaranteed
minimum interest rate. This product design can create significant financial risk.
Briys and de Varenne [8] were among the first to analyze the impact of interest rate
guarantees on the insurer’s risk exposure. However, they considered a simple point-
to-point guarantee where surplus (if any) is credited at maturity only. The financial
risks of cliquet-style guarantee products have later been investigated, e.g., by Grosen
and Jorgensen [17]. They introduce the “average interest principle”, where the insurer
aims to smooth future bonus distributions by using a bonus reserve as an additional
buffer besides the policy reserve (the client’s account). Besides valuing the contract
they also calculate default probabilities (however, under the risk-neutral probability
measure Q). Grosen et al. [19] extend the model of Grosen and Jorgensen [17], and
introduce mortality risk. Grosen and Jorgensen [18] modify the model used by Briys
and de Varenne [8] by incorporating a regulatory constraint for the insurer’s assets
and analyzing the consequences for the insurer’s risk policy. Mitersen and Persson
[23] analyze a different cliquet-style guarantee framework with the so-called terminal
bonuses, whereas Bauer et al. [4] specifically investigate the valuation of participating
contracts under the German regulatory framework.
While all this work focuses on the risk-neutral valuation of life insurance contracts
(sometimes referred to as “financial approach”), Kling et al. [20, 21] concentrate
on the risk a contract imposes on the insurer (sometimes referred to as “actuar-
ial approach”) by means of shortfall probabilities under the real-world probability
measure P.
Barbarin and Devolder [3] introduce a methodology that allows for combining
the financial and actuarial approach. They consider a contract similar to Briys and
de Varenne [8] with a point-to-point guarantee and terminal surplus participation.
To integrate both approaches, they use a two-step method of pricing life insurance
contracts: First, they determine a guaranteed interest rate such that certain regulatory
requirements are satisfied, using value at risk and expected shortfall risk measures.
Second, to obtain fair contracts, they use risk-neutral valuation and adjust the par-
ticipation in terminal surplus accordingly. Based on this methodology, Gatzert and
Kling [14] investigate parameter combinations that yield fair contracts and analyze
the risk implied by fair contracts for various contract designs. Gatzert [13] extends
this approach by introducing the concept of “risk pricing” using the “fair value of
default” to determine contracts with the same risk exposure. Graf et al. [16] (also
building on Barbarin and Devolder [3]) derive the risk minimizing asset allocation
for fair contracts using different risk measures like the shortfall probability or the
relative expected shortfall.
Under risk-based solvency frameworks such as Solvency II or the Swiss Solvency
Test (SST), the risk analysis of interest rate guarantees becomes even more impor-
tant. Under these frameworks, capital requirement is derived from a market consistent
valuation considering the insurer’s risk. This risk is particularly high for long term
contracts with a year-to-year guarantee based on a fixed (i.e., not path dependent)
guaranteed interest rate. Measuring and analyzing the financial risk in relation to the
required capital, and analyzing new risk figures such as the Time Value of Options
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and Guarantees (TVOG) is a relatively new aspect, which gains importance with
new solvability frameworks, e.g., the largest German insurance company (Allianz)
announced in a press conference on June 25, 20131 the introduction of a new partici-
pating life insurance product that (among other features) fundamentally modifies the
type of interest rate guarantee (similar to what we propose in the remainder of this
paper). It was stressed that the TVOG is significantly reduced for the new product.
Also, it was mentioned that the increase of the TVOG resulting from an interest rate
shock (i.e., the solvency capital requirement for interest rate risk) is reduced by 80 %
when compared to the previous product. This is consistent with the findings of this
paper.
The aim of this paper is a comprehensive risk analysis of different contract designs
for participating life insurance products. Currently, there is an ongoing discussion,
whether and how models assessing the insurer’s risk should be modified to reduce the
capital requirements (e.g., by applying an “ultimate forward rate” set by the regula-
tor). We will in contrast analyze how (for a given model) the insurer’s risk, and hence
capital requirement can be influenced by product design. Since traditional cliquet-
style participating life insurance products lead to very high capital requirements, we
will introduce alternative contract designs with modified types of guarantees, which
reduce the insurer’s risk and profit volatility, and therefore also the capital require-
ments under risk-based solvency frameworks. In order to compare different product
designs from an insurer’s perspective, we develop and discuss the concept of Capital
Efficiency, which relates profit to capital requirements.2 We identify the key drivers
of Capital Efficiency, which are then used in our analyses to assess different product
designs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
In Sect. 2, we present three considered contract designs that all come with the
same level of guaranteed maturity benefit but with different types of guarantee:
• Traditional product: a traditional contract with a cliquet-style guarantee based on
a guaranteed interest rate > 0.
• Alternative product 1: a contract with the same guaranteed maturity benefit, which
is, however, valid only at maturity; additionally, there is a 0 % year-to-year guar-
antee on the account value meaning that the account value cannot decrease from
one year to the next.
• Alternative product 2: a contract with the same guaranteed maturity benefit that is,
however, valid only at maturity; there is no year-to-year guarantee on the account
value meaning that the account value may decrease in some years.
1 Cf. [1], particularly slide D24.
2 Of course, there already exist other well-established measures linking profit to required capital,
such as the return on risk-adjusted capital (RORAC). However, they may not be suitable to assess
products with long-term guarantees since they consider the required capital on a one-year basis only.
To the best of our knowledge there is no common measure similar to what we define as Capital
Efficiency that relates the profitability of an insurance contract to the risk it generates, and hence
capital it requires over the whole contract term.
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On top of the different types of guarantees, all three products include a surplus
participation depending on the insurer’s return on assets. Our model is based on
the surplus participation requirements given by German regulation. That means in
particular that each year at least 90 % of the (book value) investment return has to be
distributed to the policyholders.
To illustrate the mechanics, we will first analyze the different products under
different deterministic scenarios. This shows the differences in product design and
how they affect the insurer’s risk.
In Sect. 3, we introduce our stochastic model, which is based on a standard fi-
nancial market model: The stock return and short rate processes are modeled using
a correlated Black-Scholes and Vasicek model.3 We then describe how the evolu-
tion of the insurance portfolio and the insurer’s balance sheet are simulated in our
asset-liability-model. The considered asset allocation consists of bonds with differ-
ent maturities and stocks. The model also incorporates management rules as well as
typical intertemporal risk sharing mechanisms (e.g., building and dissolving unreal-
ized gains and losses), which are an integral part of participating contracts in many
countries and should therefore not be neglected.
Furthermore, we introduce a measure for Capital Efficiency based on currently
discussed solvency regulations such as the Solvency II framework. We also propose
a more tractable measure for an assessment of the key drivers of Capital Efficiency.
In Sect. 4, we present the numerical results. We show that the alternative products
are significantly more capital efficient: financial risk, and therefore also capital re-
quirement is significantly reduced, although in most scenarios all products provide
the same maturity benefit to the policyholder.4 We observe that the typical “asymme-
try”, i.e., particularly the heavy left tail of the insurer’s profit distribution is reduced
by the modified products. This leads to a significant reduction of both, the TVOG
and the solvency capital requirement for interest rate risk.
Section 5 concludes and provides an outlook for further research.
2 Considered Products
In this section, we describe the three different considered contract designs. Note that
for the sake of simplicity, we assume that in case of death in year t , always only the
current account value AVt (defined below) is paid at the end of year t . This allows
us to ignore mortality for the calculation of premiums and actuarial reserves.
3 The correlated Black-Scholes and Vasicek model is applied in Zaglauer and Bauer [29] and Bauer
et al. [5] in a similar way.
4 Note: In scenarios where the products’ maturity benefits do differ, the difference is limited since
the guaranteed maturity benefit (which is the same for all three products) is a lower bound for the
maturity benefit.
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2.1 The Traditional Product
First, we consider a traditional participating life insurance contract with a cliquet-
style guarantee. It provides a guaranteed benefit G at maturity T based on annual
premium payments P . The pricing is based on a constant guaranteed interest rate i
and reflects annual charges ct . The actuarial principle of equivalence5 yields
T −1∑
t=0
(P − ct ) · (1 + i)T −t = G. (1)
During the lifetime of the contract, the insurer has to build up sufficient (prospective)
actuarial reserves ARt for the guaranteed benefit based on the same constant interest
rate i :














The development of the actuarial reserves is then given by:
ARt = (ARt−1 + P − ct−1) · (1 + i).
Traditional participating life insurance contracts typically include an annual sur-
plus participation that depends on the performance of the insurer’s assets. For exam-
ple, German regulation requires that at least a “minimum participation” of p = 90 %
of the (local GAAP book value) earnings on the insurer’s assets has to be credited
to the policyholders’ accounts. For the traditional product, any surplus assigned to
a contract immediately increases the guaranteed benefit based on the same interest
rate i . More precisely, the surplus st is credited to a bonus reserve account B Rt
(where B R0 = 0) and the interest rate i will also apply each year on the bonus
reserve:
B Rt = B Rt−1 · (1 + i) + st .
The client’s account value AVt consists of the sum of the actuarial reserve ARt and
the bonus reserve B Rt ; the maturity benefit is equal to AVT .
As a consequence, each year at least the rate i has to be credited to the contracts.
The resulting optionality is often referred to as asymmetry: If the asset return is above
i , a large part (e.g., p = 90 %) of the return is credited to the client as a surplus and
the shareholders receive only a small portion (e.g., 1 − p = 10 %) of the return.
If, on the other hand, the asset returns are below i , then 100 % of the shortfall has
to be compensated by the shareholder. Additionally, if the insurer distributes a high
surplus, this increases the insurer’s future risk since the rate i has to be credited also
to this surplus amount in subsequent years. Such products constitute a significant
5 For the equivalence principle, see e.g., Saxer [25], Wolthuis [28].
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Fig. 1 Two illustrative deterministic scenarios for the traditional product: asset returns and yield
distribution
financial risk to the insurance company, in particular in a framework of low interest
rates and volatile capital markets.6
The mechanics of this year-to-year guarantee are illustrated in Fig. 1 for two
illustrative deterministic scenarios. We consider a traditional policy with term to
maturity T = 20 years and a guaranteed benefit of G = e20,000. Following the
current situation in Germany, we let i = 1.75 % and assume a surplus participation
rate of p = 90 % on the asset returns.
The first scenario is not critical for the insurer. The asset return (which is here
arbitrarily assumed for illustrative purposes) starts at 3 %, then over time drops to 2 %
and increases back to 3 % where the x axis shows the policy year. The chart shows
this asset return, the “client’s yield” (i.e., the interest credited to the client’s account
including surplus), the “required yield” (which is defined as the minimum rate that
has to be credited to the client’s account), and the insurer’s yield (which is the portion
of the surplus that goes to the shareholder). Obviously, in this simple example, the
client’s yield always amounts to 90 % of the asset return and the insurer’s yield
always amounts to 10 % of the asset return. By definition, for this contract design,
the required yield is constant and always coincides with i = 1.75 %.
In the second scenario, we let the asset return drop all the way down to 1 %.
Whenever 90 % of the asset return would be less than the required yield, the insurer
has to credit the required yield to the account value. This happens at the shareholder’s
expense, i.e., the insurer’s yield is reduced and even becomes negative. This means
that a shortfall occurs and the insurer has to provide additional funds.
It is worthwhile noting that in this traditional product design, the interest rate i
plays three different roles:
• pricing interest rate i p used for determining the ratio between the premium and
the guaranteed maturity benefit,
• reserving interest rate ir , i.e., technical interest rate used for the calculation of the
prospective actuarial reserves,
• year-to-year minimum guaranteed interest rate ig , i.e., a minimum return on the
account value.
6 This was also a key result of the QIS5 final report preparing for Solvency II, cf. [2, 11].
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2.2 Alternative Products
We will now introduce two alternative product designs, which are based on the idea
to allow different values for the pricing rate, the reserving rate and the year-to-
year minimum guaranteed interest rate on the account value. So Formulas 1 and 2
translate to the following formulae for the relation between the annual premium, the
guaranteed benefit and the actuarial reserves:
T −1∑
t=0
(P − ct ) ·
(
1 + i p
)T −t = G














Note, that in the first years of the contract, negative values for ARt are possible in
case of i p < ir , which implies a “financial buffer” at the beginning of the contract.
The year-to-year minimum guaranteed interest rate ig is not relevant for the formulae
above, but it is simply a restriction for the development of the client’s account, i.e.,





where AV0 = max {AR0, 0} is the initial account value of the contract.
The crucial difference between such new participating products and traditional
participating products is that the guaranteed maturity benefit is not explicitly in-
creased during the lifetime of the contract (but, of course, an increase in the account
value combined with the year-to-year minimum guaranteed interest rate can implic-
itly increase the maturity guarantee).
In this setting, the prospective reserve ARt is only a minimum reserve for the
guaranteed maturity benefit: The insurer has to make sure that the account value
does not fall below this minimum reserve. This results in a “required yield” explained
below. Under “normal” circumstances the account value (which is also the surrender
value) exceeds the minimum reserve. Therefore, the technical reserve (under local
GAAP), which may not be below the surrender value, coincides with the account
value.
The required yield on the account value in year t is equal to
zt = max
{
max {ARt , 0}
AVt−1 + P − ct−1 − 1, ig
}
. (3)
The left part of (3) assures that the account value is nonnegative and never lower
than the actuarial reserve. The required yield decreases if the bonus reserve (which
is included in AVt−1) increases.
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The surplus participation rules remain unchanged: the policyholder’s share p
(e.g., 90 %) of the asset return is credited to the policyholders (but not less than zt ).
Hence, as long as the policyholder’s share is always above the technical interest rate
used in the traditional product, there is no difference between the traditional and the
alternative product designs.
Obviously, only combinations fulfilling ig ≤ i p ≤ ir result in suitable products:
If the first inequality is violated, then the year-to-year minimum guaranteed interest
rate results in a higher (implicitly) guaranteed maturity benefit than the (explicit)
guarantee resulting from the pricing rate. If the second inequality is violated then at
t = 0, additional reserves (exceeding the first premium) are required.
In what follows, we will consider two concrete alternative contract designs. Ob-
viously, the choice of ig fundamentally changes the mechanics of the guarantee em-
bedded in the product (or the “type” of guarantee), whereas the choice of i p changes
the level of the guarantee. Since the focus of this paper is on the effect of the different
guarantee mechanisms, we use a pricing rate that coincides with the technical rate of
the traditional product. Hence, the guaranteed maturity benefit remains unchanged.
Since the legally prescribed maximum value for the reserving rate also coincides
with the technical rate of the traditional product, we get i p = ir = 1.75 % for both
considered alternative designs.
In our alternative product 1, we set ig = 0 % (0 % year-to-year guarantee) and for
alternative 2 we set ig = −100 % (no year-to-year guarantee). In order to illustrate
the mechanics of the alternative products, Figs. 2 and 3 show the two scenarios
from Fig. 1 for both alternative products. In the first scenario (shown on the left),
the required yield zt on the account value gradually decreases for both alternative
contract designs since the bonus reserve acts as some kind of buffer (as described
above). For alternative 1, the required yield can of course not fall below ig = 0 %,
while for the alternative 2 it even becomes negative after some years.
The adverse scenario on the right shows that the required yield rises again after
years with low asset returns since the buffer is reduced. However, contrary to the
traditional product, the asset return stays above the required level and no shortfall
occurs.
Fig. 2 Two illustrative deterministic scenarios for alternative 1 product: asset returns and yield
distribution
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Fig. 3 Two illustrative deterministic scenarios for alternative 2 product: asset returns and yield
distribution
From a policyholder’s perspective, both alternative contract designs provide the
same maturity benefit as the traditional contract design in the first scenario since the
client’s yield is always above 1.75 %. In the second scenario, however, the maturity
benefit is slightly lower for both alternative contract designs since (part of) the buffer
built up in years 1 to 8 can be used to avoid a shortfall. In this scenario, the two
alternative products coincide, since the client’s yield is always positive.
Even if scenarios where the products differ appear (or are) unlikely, the mod-
ification has a significant impact on the insurer’s solvency requirements since the
financial risks particularly in adverse scenarios are a key driver for the solvency cap-
ital requirement. This will be considered in a stochastic framework in the following
sections.
3 Stochastic Modeling and Analyzed Key Figures
Since surplus participation is typically based on local GAAP book values (in particu-
lar in Continental Europe), we use a stochastic balance sheet and cash flow projection
model for the analysis of the product designs presented in the previous section. The
model includes management rules concerning asset allocation, reinvestment strat-
egy, handling of unrealized gains and losses and surplus distribution. Since the focus
of the paper is on the valuation of future profits and capital requirements we will
introduce the model under a risk-neutral measure. Similar models have been used
(also in a real-world framework) in Kling et al. [20, 21] and Graf et al. [16].
3.1 The Financial Market Model
We assume that the insurer’s assets are invested in coupon bonds and stocks. We
treat both assets as risky assets in a risk-neutral, frictionless and continuous financial
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market. Additionally, cash flows during the year are invested in a riskless bank
account (until assets are reallocated). We let the short rate process rt follow a Vasicek7
model, and the stock price St follow a geometric Brownian motion:
drt = κ (θ − rt ) dt + σr dW (1)t and
dSt
St
= rt dt + ρσSdW (1)t +
√
1 − ρ2σSdW (2)t ,
where W (1)t and W
(2)
t each denote a Wiener process on some probability space
(Ω,F , F, Q) with a risk-neutral measure Q and the natural filtration F = Ft =
σ
((
W (1)s , W (2)s
)
, s < t
)
. The parameters κ, θ, σr , σS and ρ are deterministic and
constant. For the purpose of performing Monte Carlo simulations, the stochastic
differential equations can be solved to
















1 − ρ2σSdW (2)u
⎞
⎠ and
rt = e−κ · rt−1 + θ
(
1 − e−κ) +
t∫
t−1
σr · e−κ(t−u)dW (1)u ,
where S0 = 1 and the initial short rate r0 is a deterministic parameter. Then, the bank




. It can be shown that the four (stochastic)
integrals in the formulae above follow a joint normal distribution.8 Monte Carlo
paths are calculated using random realizations of this multidimensional distribution.































for any time t and term s > 0. Based on the yield curves, we calculate par yields that
determine the coupon rates of the considered coupon bonds.
7 Cf. [27].
8 Cf. Zaglauer and Bauer [29]. A comprehensive explanation of this property is included in
Bergmann [6].
9 See Seyboth [26] as well as Branger and Schlag [7].
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3.2 The Asset-Liability Model
The insurer’s simplified balance sheet at time t is given by Table 1. Since our analysis
is performed for a specific portfolio of insurance contracts on a stand-alone basis,
there is no explicit allowance for shareholders’ equity or other reserves on the liability
side. Rather, Xt denotes the shareholders’ profit or loss in year t , with corresponding
cash flow at the beginning of the next year. Together with AVt as defined in Sect. 2,
this constitutes the liability side of our balance sheet.
In our projection of the assets and insurance contracts, incoming cash flows (pre-
mium payments at the beginning of the year, coupon payments and repayment of
nominal at the end of the year) and outgoing cash flows (expenses at the beginning of
the year and benefit payments at the end of the year) occur. In each simulation path,
cash flows occurring at the beginning of the year are invested in a bank account. At
the end of the year, the market values of the stocks and coupon bonds are derived and
the asset allocation is readjusted according to a rebalancing strategy with a constant
stock ratio q based on market values. Conversely, (1 − q) is invested in bonds and
any money on the bank account is withdrawn and invested in the portfolio consisting
of stocks and bonds.
If additional bonds need to be bought in the process of rebalancing, the corre-
sponding amount is invested in coupon bonds yielding at par with term M . However,
toward the end of the projection, when the insurance contracts’ remaining term is
less than M years, we invest in bonds with a term that coincides with the longest
remaining term of the insurance contracts. If bonds need to be sold, they are sold
proportionally to the market values of the different bonds in the existing portfolio.
With respect to accounting, we use book-value accounting rules following German
GAAP, which may result in unrealized gains or losses (UGL): Coupon bonds are
considered as held to maturity and their book value BV Bt is always given by their
nominal amounts (irrespective if the market value is higher or lower). In contrast,
for the book value of the stocks BV St , the insurer has some discretion.
Of course, interest rate movements as well as the rebalancing will cause fluc-
tuations with respect to the UGL of bonds. Also, the rebalancing may lead to the
realization of UGL of stocks. In addition, we assume an additional management rule
with respect to UGL of stocks: We assume that the insurer wants to create rather
stable book value returns (and hence surplus distributions) in order to signal stability
to the market. We, therefore, assume that a ratio dpos of the UGL of stocks is realized
annually if unrealized gains exist and a ratio dneg of the UGL is realized annually
if unrealized losses exist. In particular, dneg = 100 % has to be chosen in a legal
framework where unrealized losses on stocks are not possible.
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Based on this model, the total asset return on a book value basis can be calculated
in each simulation path each year as the sum of coupon payments from bonds,
interest payments on the bank account, and the realization of UGL. The split between
policyholders and shareholders is driven by the minimum participation parameter p
explained in Sect. 2. If the cumulative required yield on the account values of all
policyholders is larger than this share, there is no surplus for the policyholders,
and exactly the respective required yield zt is credited to every account. Otherwise,
surplus is credited, which amounts to the difference between the policyholders’ share
of the asset return and the cumulative required yield. Following the typical practice,
e.g., in Germany, we assume that this surplus is distributed among the policyholders
such that all policyholders receive the same client’s yield (defined by the required
yield plus surplus rate), if possible. To achieve that, we apply an algorithm that
sorts the accounts by required yield, i.e.,
(




, k ∈ N in ascending order.
First, all contracts receive their respective required yield. Then, the available surplus
is distributed: Starting with the contract(s) with the lowest required yield z(1)t , the
algorithm distributes the available surplus to all these contracts until the gap to the
next required yield z(2)t is filled. Then, all the contracts with a required yield lower
or equal to z(2)t receive an equal amount of (relative) surplus until the gap to z(3)t is
filled, etc. This is continued until the entire surplus is distributed. The result is that
all contracts receive the same client’s yield if this unique client’s yield exceeds the
required yield of all contracts. Otherwise, there exists a threshold z∗ such that all
contracts with a required yield above z∗ receive exactly their required yield (and no
surplus) and all contracts with a required yield below z∗ receive z∗ (i.e., they receive
some surplus).
From this, the insurer’s profit Xt results as the difference between the total asset
return and the amount credited to all policyholder accounts. If the profit is negative,
a shortfall has occurred, which we assume to be compensated by a corresponding
capital inflow (e.g., from the insurer’s shareholders) at the beginning of the next
year.10 Balance sheet and cash flows are projected over τ years until all policies that
are in force at time zero have matured.
3.3 Key Drivers for Capital Efficiency
The term Capital Efficiency is frequently used in an intuitive sense, in particular
among practitioners, to describe the feasibility, profitability, capital requirement,
and riskiness of products under risk-based solvency frameworks. However, to the
best of our knowledge, no formal definition of this term exists. Nevertheless, it
seems obvious that capital requirement alone is not a suitable figure for managing a
10 We do not consider the shareholders’ default put option resulting from their limited liability,
which is in line with both, Solvency II valuation standards and the Market Consistent Embedded
Value framework (MCEV), cf. e.g., [5] or [10], Sect. 5.3.4.
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product portfolio from an insurer’s perspective. Rather, capital requirement and the
resulting cost of capital should be considered in relation to profitability.
Therefore, a suitable measure of Capital Efficiency could be some ratio of prof-










The numerator represents the present value of the insurer’s future profits, whereas the
denominator is equal to the present value of future cost of capital: RCt denotes the
required capital at time t under some risk-based solvency framework, i.e., the amount
of shareholders’ equity needed to support the business in force. The cost of capital
is derived by applying the cost of capital rate CoCt for year t on the required capital
at the beginning of this year.11 In practical applications, however, the distribution of
this ratio might not be easy to calculate. Therefore, moments of this distribution, a
separate analysis of (moments of) the numerator and the denominator or even just
an analysis of key drivers for that ratio could create some insight.
In this spirit, we will use a Monte Carlo framework to calculate the following key
figures using the model described above:
A typical market consistent measure for the insurer’s profitability is the expected
present value of future profits (PVFP),12 which corresponds to the expected value of














where N is the number of scenarios, X (n)t denotes the insurer’s profit/loss in year t
in scenario n, B(n)t is the value of the bank account after t years in scenario n, and
hence PVFP(n) is the present value of future profits in scenario n.
In addition, the degree of asymmetry of the shareholder’s cash flows can be char-
acterized by the distribution of PVFP(n) over all scenarios13 and by the time value of
options and guarantees (TVOG). Under the MCEV framework,14 the latter is defined
by
TVOG = PVFPC E − PVFP
11 This approach is similar to the calculation of the cost of residual nonhedgeable risk as introduced in
the MCEV Principles in [9], although RCt reflects the total capital requirement including hedgeable
risks.
12 The concept of PVFP is introduced as part of the MCEV Principles in [9].
13 Note that this is a distribution under the risk-neutral measure and has to be interpreted carefully.
However, it can be useful for explaining differences between products regarding PVFP and TVOG.
14 Cf. [9].
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Table 2 Product parameters I
Traditional Product (%) Alternative 1 (%) Alternative 2 (%)
i p, ir 1.75 1.75 1.75
ig 1.75 0 –100




is the present value of future profits in the so-called
“certainty equivalent” (CE) scenario. This deterministic scenario reflects the expected
development of the capital market under the risk-neutral measure. It can be derived
from the initial yield curve r0(s) based on the assumption that all assets earn the
forward rate implied by the initial yield curve.15 The TVOG is also used as an
indicator for capital requirement under risk-based solvency frameworks.
Comparing the PVFP for two different interest rate levels—one that we call ba-
sic level and a significantly lower one that we call stress level—provides another
important key figure for interest rate risk and capital requirements. In the standard
formula16 of the Solvency II framework
ΔPVFP = PVFP(basic) − PVFP(stress)
determines the contribution of the respective product to the solvency capital require-
ment for interest rate risk (SCRint ). Therefore, we also focus on this figure which
primarily drives the denominator in (4).
4 Results
4.1 Assumptions
The stochastic valuation model described in the previous section is applied to a
portfolio of participating contracts. For simplicity, we assume that all policyholders
are 40 years old at inception of the contract and mortality is based on the German
standard mortality table (DAV 2008 T). We do not consider surrender. Furthermore,
we assume annual charges ct that are typical in the German market consisting of
annual administration charges β ·P throughout the contract’s lifetime, and acquisition
charges α · T · P , which are equally distributed over the first 5 years of the contract.
Hence, ct = β · P + α T ·P5  t∈{0,...,4}. Furthermore, we assume that expenses coincide
with the charges. Product parameters are given in Tables 2 and 3.
Stochastic projections are performed for a portfolio that was built up in the past
20 years (i.e., before t = 0) based on 1,000 new policies per year. Hence, we have a
15 Cf. Oechslin et al. [24].
16 A description of the current version of the standard formula can be found in [12].
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Table 3 Product parameters II
G(e) T (years) P(e) β (%) α (%)
20,000 20 896.89 3 4
portfolio at the beginning of the projections with remaining time to maturity between
1 year and 19 years (i.e., τ = 19 years).17 For each contract, the account value at
t = 0 is derived from a projection in a deterministic scenario. In this deterministic
scenario, we use a flat yield curve of 3.0 % (consistent with the mean reversion
parameter θ of the stochastic model after t = 0), and parameters for management
rules described below. In line with the valuation approach under Solvency II and
MCEV, we do not consider new business.
The book value of the asset portfolio at t = 0 coincides with the book value of
liabilities. We assume a stock ratio of q = 5 % with unrealized gains on stocks at
t = 0 equal to 10 % of the book value of stocks. The coupon bond portfolio consists
of bonds with a uniform coupon of 3.0 % where the time to maturity is equally split
between 1 year and M = 10 years.
Capital market parameters for the basic and stress projections are shown in Table 4.
The parameters κ, σr , σS and ρ are directly adopted from Graf et al. [16]. The pa-
rameters θ and r0 are chosen such that they are more in line with the current low
interest rate level. The capital market stress corresponds to an immediate drop of
interest rates by 100 basis points.
The parameters for the management rules are given in Table 5 and are consistent
with current regulation and practice in the German insurance market.
For all projections, the number of scenarios is N = 5,000. Further analyses
showed that this allows for a sufficiently precise estimation of the relevant figures.18
Table 4 Capital market parameters
r0 (%) θ (%) κ (%) σr (%) σS (%) ρ (%)
Basic 2.5 3.0 30.0 2.0 20.0 15.0
Stress 1.5 2.0
17 Note that due to mortality before t = 0, the number of contracts for the different remaining times
to maturity is not the same.
18 In order to reduce variance in the sample an antithetic path selection of the random numbers is
applied, cf. e.g., Glasserman [15].
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Table 5 Parameters for management rules
q (%) M (years) dpos (%) dneg(%) p (%)
5 10 20 100 90
4.2 Comparison of Product Designs
In Table 6, the PVFP and the TVOG for the base case are compared for the three
products. All results are displayed as a percentage of the present value of future
premium income from the portfolio. For alternative 1, the PVFP increases from
3.63 to 4.24 %, i.e., by 0.61 percentage points (pp), compared to the traditional
contract design (which corresponds to a 17 % increase of profitability). This means
that this product with a “maturity only” guarantee and an additional guarantee that
the account value will not decrease is, as expected, more profitable than the product
with a traditional year-to-year (cliquet-style) guarantee. This difference is mainly
caused by the different degree of asymmetry of the shareholders’ cash flows which is
characterized by the TVOG. Since PVFPC E amounts to 4.26 % for all products in the
base case, the difference of TVOG between the traditional product and alternative
1 is also 0.61 pp. This corresponds to a TVOG reduction of more than 90 % for
alternative 1, which shows that the risk resulting from the interest rate guarantee is
much lower for the modified product.
Compared to this, the differences between alternative 1 and alternative 2 are
almost negligible. The additional increase of the PVFP is only 0.01 pp, which is due
to a slightly lower TVOG compared to alternative 1. This shows that the fact that
the account value may decrease in some years in alternative 2 does not provide a
material additional risk reduction.
Additional insights can be obtained by analyzing the distribution of PVFP(n) (see
Fig. 4)19: For the traditional contract design, the distribution is highly asymmetric
with a strong left tail and a significant risk of negative shareholder cash flows (on a
present value basis). In contrast, both alternative contract designs exhibit an almost
symmetric distribution of shareholder cash flows which explains the low TVOG.
Hence, the new products result in a significantly more stable profit perspective for
the shareholders, while for the traditional product the shareholder is exposed to
significantly higher shortfall risk.
Ultimately, the results described above can be traced back to differences in the
required yield. While for the traditional product, by definition, the required yield
always amounts to 1.75 %, it is equal to 0 % in most scenarios for the alternative 1
product. Only in the most adverse scenarios, the required yield rises toward 1.75 %.20
For the alternative 2 product, it is even frequently negative.
19 Cf. Footnote 13.
20 Note that here, the required yield in the first projection year reflects the financial buffer available
for the considered portfolio of existing contracts at t = 0. This is different from the illustrations in
Sect. 2, which consider individual contracts from inception to maturity.
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Fig. 4 Histogram of PVFP(n) in base case
Table 6 PVFP and TVOG for base case (as percentage of the present value of premium income)
Traditional product (%) Alternative 1 (%) Alternative 2 (%)
PVFP 3.63 4.24 4.25
TVOG 0.63 0.02 0.01
Apart from the higher profitability, the alternative contract designs also result
in a lower capital requirement for interest rate risk. This is illustrated in Table 7,
which displays the PVFP under the interest rate stress and the difference to the basic
level. Compared to the basic level, the PVFP for the traditional product decreases
by 75 %, which corresponds to an SCRint of 2.73 % of the present value of future
premium income. In contrast, the PVFP decreases by only around 40 % for the
alternative contract designs and thus the capital requirement is only 1.66 and 1.65 %,
respectively.
We have seen that a change in the type of guarantee results in a significant increase
of the PVFP. Further analyses show that a traditional product with guaranteed interest
rate i = 0.9 % instead of 1.75 % would have the same PVFP (i.e., 4.25 %) as the
alternative contract designs with i p = 1.75 %. Hence, although changing only the
type of guarantee and leaving the level of guarantee intact might be perceived as a
rather small product modification by the policyholder, it has the same effect on the
insurer’s profitability as reducing the level of guarantee by a significant amount.
Furthermore, our results indicate that even in an adverse capital market situation
the alternative product designs may still provide an acceptable level of profitability:
The profitability of the modified products if interest rates were 50 basis points lower
roughly coincides with the profitability of the traditional product in the base case.
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Table 7 PVFP for stress level and PVFP difference between basic and stress level
Traditional product (%) Alternative 1 (%) Alternative 2 (%)
PVFP(basic) 3.63 4.24 4.25
PVFP(stress) 0.90 2.58 2.60
ΔPVFP 2.73 1.66 1.65
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses
In order to assess the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, we
investigate three different sensitivities:
1. Interest rate sensitivity: The long-term average θ and initial rate r0 in Table 4 are
replaced by θ = 2.0 %, r0 = 1.5 % for the basic level, and θ = 1.0 %, r0 = 0.5 %
for the stress level.
2. Stock ratio sensitivity: The stock ratio is set to q = 10 % instead of 5 %.
3. Initial buffer sensitivity: The initial bonus reserve B Rt = AVt − ARt is doubled
for all contracts.21
The results are given in Table 8.
Interest rate sensitivity If the assumed basic interest rate level is lowered by
100 basis points, the PVFP decreases and the TVOG increases significantly for all
products. In particular, the alternative contract designs now also exhibit a significant
TVOG. This shows that in an adverse capital market situation, also the guaran-
tees embedded in the alternative contract designs can lead to a significant risk for
the shareholder and an asymmetric distribution of profits as illustrated in Fig. 5.
Nevertheless, the alternative contract designs are still much more profitable and less
volatile than the traditional contract design and the changes in PVFP/TVOG are
much less pronounced than for the traditional product: while the TVOG rises from
0.63 to 2.13 %, i.e., by 1.50 pp for the traditional product, it rises by only 0.76 pp
(from 0.02 to 0.78 %) for alternative 1.
As expected, an additional interest rate stress now results in a larger SCRint . For
all product designs, the PVFP after stress is negative and the capital requirement
increases significantly. However, as in the base case (cf. Table 7), the SCRint for
the traditional product is more than one percentage point larger than for the new
products.
Stock ratio sensitivity The stock ratio sensitivity also leads to a decrease of PVFP
and an increase of TVOG for all products. Again, the effect on the PVFP of the
traditional product is much stronger: The profit is about cut in half (from 3.63 to
1.80 %), while for the alternative 1 product the reduction is much smaller (from 4.24
to 3.83 %), and even smaller for alternative 2 (from 4.25 to 3.99 %). It is noteworthy
that with a larger stock ratio of q = 10 % the difference between the two alternative
21 The initial book and market values of the assets are increased proportionally to cover this addi-
tional reserve.
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Table 8 PVFP, TVOG, PVFP under interest rate stress and ΔPVFP for base case and all
sensitivities
Base case Traditional product (%) Alternative 1 (%) Alternative 2 (%)
PVFP 3.63 4.24 4.25
TVOG 0.63 0.02 0.01
PVFP(stress) 0.90 2.58 2.60
ΔPVFP 2.73 1.66 1.65
Interest rate sensitivity
PVFP 0.90 2.58 2.60
TVOG 2.13 0.78 0.76
PVFP(stress) −4.66 −1.81 −1.76
ΔPVFP 5.56 4.39 4.36
Stock ratio sensitivity
PVFP 1.80 3.83 3.99
TVOG 2.45 0.43 0.26
PVFP(stress) −1.43 1.65 1.92
ΔPVFP 3.23 2.18 2.07
Initial buffer sensitivity
PVFP 3.74 4.39 4.39
TVOG 0.64 <0.01 <0.01
PVFP(stress) 1.02 2.87 2.91
ΔPVFP 2.72 1.52 1.48
products becomes more pronounced, which is reflected by the differences of the
TVOG. Alternative 2 has a lower shortfall risk than alternative 1 since the account
value may decrease in some years as long as the account value does not fall below
the minimum reserve for the maturity guarantee. Hence, we can conclude that the
guarantee that the account value may not decrease becomes more risky if asset returns
exhibit a higher volatility.
The results for the stressed PVFPs under the stock ratio sensitivity are in line with
these results: First, the traditional product requires even more solvency capital: The
SCRint is half a percentage point larger than in the base case (3.23 % compared to
2.73 %), and it is also more than one percentage point larger than for the alternative
products with 10 % stocks (2.18/2.07 %). Second, the interest rate stress shows a
more substantial difference between the two different alternative products. While
the difference of the SCRint between alternative 1 and 2 was 0.01 % in the base case,
it is now 0.11 %.
Initial buffer sensitivity If the initial buffer is increased, we observe a slight in-
crease of the PVFP for all products. However, there are remarkable differences for
the effect on TVOG between the traditional and the alternative products: While for
the traditional product the TVOG remains approximately the same, for the alterna-
tive products it is essentially reduced to zero. This strongly supports our product
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Fig. 5 Histogram of PVFP(n) for interest rate sensitivity (−100 basis points)
motivation in Sect. 2: For the alternative products, larger surpluses from previous
years reduce risk in future years.22 Furthermore, the stressed PVFPs imply that the
decrease of capital requirement is significantly larger for the alternative products:
0.14 % reduction (from 1.66 to 1.52 %) for alternative 1 and 0.17 % reduction (from
1.65 to 1.48 %) for alternative 2, compared to just 0.01 % reduction for the traditional
product.
4.4 Reduction in the Level of Guarantee
So far we have only considered contracts with a different type of guarantee. We will
now analyze contracts with a lower level of guarantee, i.e., products where i p < ir .
If we apply a pricing rate of i p = 1.25 % instead of 1.75 %, the annual premium
required to achieve the same guaranteed maturity benefit rises by approx. 5.4 %,
which results in an additional initial buffer for this contract design. For the sake of
comparison, we also calculate the results for the traditional product with a lower
guaranteed interest rate i = 1.25 %. The respective portfolios at t = 0 are derived
using the assumptions described in Sect. 4.1.
The results are presented in Table 9. We can see that the PVFP is further increased
and the TVOG is very close to 0 for the modified alternative products, which implies
an almost symmetric distribution of the PVFP. The TVOG can even become slightly
negative due to the additional buffer in all scenarios. Although the risk situation for
the traditional product is also improved significantly due to the lower guarantee, the
22 From this, we can conclude that if such alternative products had been sold in the past, the risk
situation of the life insurance industry would be significantly better today in spite of the rather high
nominal maturity guarantees for products sold in the past.
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Table 9 PVFP, TVOG, PVFP under interest rate stress and ΔPVFP for the alternative products
with lower pricing rate
Traditional Alternative Alternative Traditional Alternative 1 Alternative 2
product (%) 1 (%) 2 (%) i = 1.25 (%) i p = 1.25 (%) i p = 1.25 (%)
PVFP 3.63 4.24 4.25 4.12 4.31 4.31
TVOG 0.63 0.02 0.01 0.14 −0.05 −0.05
PVFP
(stress)
0.90 2.58 2.60 2.43 3.28 3.32
ΔPVFP 2.73 1.66 1.65 1.69 1.03 0.99
alternative products can still preserve their advantages. A more remarkable effect
can be seen for the SCRint , which amounts to 1.03 and 0.99 % for the alternative
products 1 and 2, respectively, compared to 1.69 % for the traditional product. Hence,
the buffer leads to a significant additional reduction of solvency capital requirements
for the alternative products meaning that these are less affected by interest rate risk.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, we have analyzed different product designs for traditional participating
life insurance contracts with a guaranteed maturity benefit. A particular focus of our
analysis was on the impact of product design on capital requirements under risk-based
solvency frameworks such as Solvency II and on the insurer’s profitability.
We have performed a market consistent valuation of the different products and
have analyzed the key drivers of Capital Efficiency, particularly the value of the
embedded options and guarantees and the insurer’s profitability.
As expected, our results confirm that products with a typical year-to-year guaran-
tee are rather risky for the insurer, and hence result in a rather high capital requirement.
Our proposed product modifications significantly enhance Capital Efficiency, reduce
the insurer’s risk, and increase profitability. Although the design of the modified prod-
ucts makes sure that the policyholder receives less than with the traditional product
only in extreme scenarios, these products still provide a massive relief for the insurer
since extreme scenarios drive the capital requirements under Solvency II and SST.
It is particularly noteworthy that starting from a standard product where the guar-
anteed maturity benefit is based on an interest rate of 1.75 %, changing the type of
the guarantee to our modified products (but leaving the level of guarantee intact) has
the same impact on profitability as reducing the level of guarantee to an interest rate
of 0.9 % and not modifying the type of guarantee. Furthermore, it is remarkable that
the reduction of SCRint from the traditional to the alternative contract design is very
robust throughout our base case as well as all sensitivities and always amounts to
slightly above one percentage point.
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We would like to stress that the product design approach presented in this paper
is not model arbitrage (hiding risks in “places the model cannot see”), but a real
reduction of economic risks. In our opinion, such concepts can be highly relevant in
practice if modified products keep the product features that are perceived and desired
by the policyholder, preserve the benefits of intertemporal risk sharing, and do away
with those options and guarantees of which policyholders often do not even know
they exist. Similar modifications are also possible for many other old age provision
products like dynamic hybrid products23 or annuity payout products. Therefore, we
expect that the importance of “risk management by product design” will increase.
This is particularly the case since—whenever the same pool of assets is used to back
new and old products—new capital efficient products might even help reduce the
risk resulting from an “old” book of business by reducing the required yield of the
pool of assets.
We, therefore, feel that there is room for additional research: It would be interesting
to analyze similar product modifications for the annuity payout phase. Also—since
many insurers have sold the traditional product in the past—an analysis of a change
in new business strategy might be worthwhile: How would an insurer’s risk and
profitability change and how would the modified products interact with the existing
business if the insurer has an existing (traditional) book of business in place and
starts selling modified products today?
Another interesting question is how the insurer’s optimal strategic asset allocation
changes if modified products are being sold: If typical criteria for determining an
optimal asset allocation are given (e.g., maximizing profitability under the restriction
that some shortfall probability or expected shortfall is not exceeded), then the c.p.
lower risk of the modified products might allow for a more risky asset allocation, and
hence also higher expected profitability for the insurer and higher expected surplus
for the policyholder. So, if this dimension is also considered, the policyholder would
be compensated for the fact that he receives a weaker type of guarantee.
Finally, our analysis so far has disregarded the demand side. If some insurers
keep selling the traditional product type, there should be little demand for the alter-
native product designs with reduced guarantees unless they provide some additional
benefits. Therefore, the insurer might share the reduced cost of capital with the poli-
cyholder, also resulting in higher expected benefits in the alternative product designs.
Since traditional participating life insurance products play a major role in old-age
provision in many countries and since these products have come under strong pressure
in the current interest environment and under risk-based solvency frameworks, the
concept of Capital Efficiency and the analysis of different product designs should be
of high significance for insurers, researchers, and regulators to identify sustainable
life insurance products. In particular, we would hope that legislators and regulators
would embrace sustainable product designs where the insurer’s risk is significantly
reduced, but key product features as perceived and requested by policyholders are
still present.
23 Cf. Kochanski and Karnarski [22].
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